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The process of telecommunications 'reform' introduced by the Labor 
government in the 1991 Telecommunications Act was completed in June 
1997. It is now clear that the reforms were fundamentally misconceived and 
have failed to deliver the promised benefits. 
 
The basic idea of the reform was to replace the public telecommunications 
monopoly with a competitive market. Reform was to proceed in two stages. 
The first was to create a full-scale competitor for Telecom Australia (renamed 
as Telstra) through the sale of the ill-starred satellite network Aussat. The 
competitor, which took the name Optus, was expected to compete with 
Telstra across the full spectrum of local, national and international phone 
services. A third firm, Vodafone, was encouraged to enter the digital mobile 
telephone market with a promise that the analog phone network, owned by 
Telstra but shared with Optus, would be phased out by the year 2000. (The 
oddity of compulsorily closing down one segment of the industry to promote 
competition in another escaped notice.) Optus was given five years in which 
to establish itself as a viable alternative to Telstra. During this period, a 
special regulator, Austel was established to control the telecommunications 
industry. 
 
The second stage of the reform was to develop a fully competitive market. 
Initially, the government contemplated retaining some control through the 
issue of new telecommunications licenses in 1997. However, this relic of 
interventionism was abandoned, with a decision to allow unrestricted entry 
from 1997 and to replace Austel with general regulation through the Australian 
Competition and Consumer Council (ACCC). 
 
In the short term, Telstra was subjected to price caps ensuring that the steady 
annual decline of 5 per cent per year in real telecommunications prices, 
achieved under the old public monopoly, would be maintained. However, it 
was expected that, by 1997 at the latest, the pressure of competition would 
eliminate the need for such regulation. Privatisation was not part of the policy 
but it was implicit in its design. Why should a government which had sold off 
airlines and banks own an enterprise in a competitive telecommunications 
industry? 
 
The Coalition government made privatisation an explicit rather than an implicit 
part of the policy, but otherwise made only marginal adjustments. Although 
rural voters were already furious about the prospect of losing the analog 
service, with no digital replacement in view, the new telecommunications 
minister Richard Alston, argued that the need to keep faith with Optus and 
Vodafone was paramount. The government that invented the idea of 'non-
core' promises to electors could not afford to break its promises to big 
business. 
 
In 1998, it has become apparent that the policy of telecommunications 
competition has failed to deliver the benefits claimed for it. For most people, 
competition is little more than a slogan. Telstra still dominates nearly all 
components of the telecommunications market. Optus has gained around 20 
per cent of the market for long-distance services, and a little more in the 
international and mobile markets, but has failed completely in its attempts to 
enter the local call market. Despite some brave rhetoric, Optus has settled 
into the role of junior partner in a comfortable duopoly. Vodafone has done 
poorly in the digital mobile market and has failed completely elsewhere. The 
post-1997 entrants have been even less impressive, collectively accounting 
for less than 10 per cent of the market.  
 
As a result, Telstra was able to report to its public and private shareholders in 
1998 that 'the pressure of competition has been considerably less than 
expected'. The only real constraint on Telstra has been the maintenance of 
price caps through regulation. Price cap regulation ensures that, on average, 
customers are no worse off under competition than they would have been 
under a continued public monopoly. This average conceals wide variation 
however. Under public monopoly, prices declined steadily across the board. 
Under price cap regulation, there has been very little reduction in 'standard' 
prices for residential users. Telstra has met its price cap by offering discounts, 
designed to appeal to those customers considered most likely to switch to 
Optus. Customers in the bush, and others in whom Optus showed no interest, 
got nothing. Although this process of 'rebalancing' is in part a response to 
competition, it is also the policy that would maximise Telstra's monopoly 
profits even in the absence of competition.  
 
The most obvious failure of competition has arisen through the duplication 
(and in the case of digital networks, triplication) of infrastructure. As part of the 
thrust towards 'network competition' Telstra and Optus raced to roll out 
parallel pay-TV networks consisting of a hybrid of coaxial cables and optic 
fibres (hybrid fibre-cable). While the streets of suburbs in Sydney and 
Melbourne were disfigured by Optus cables running side by side with Telstra's 
underground network, the smaller state capitals, and the bush, got no service 
at all. Meanwhile, Telstra, Optus and Vodafone erected three networks digital 
mobile phone towers overlooking schools and homes while offering no digital 
service in rural areas. 
 
A pay-TV network is only as good as its content, and duplication was the rule 
here as well. With the commodification of sport, the emergence of duplicate 
rugby league competitions, financed by the rival pay-TV networks, was 
scarcely a surprise. The creation of Murdoch's Super League competition 
required abrogation of contracts on a large scale, but thanks to competition 
policy, this was no problem. The Federal Court ruled that, because they 
prevented the emergence of a rival to the existing Australian Rugby League, 
such contracts were anti-competitive and therefore unenforceable.  
 
The rush to duplication ended abruptly with the introduction of unrestricted 
competition in June 1997. The cable rollouts stopped, the rival rugby leagues 
negotiated a truce, and the expansion of the digital networks slowed to a 
crawl. Telstra and Optus were willing to waste billions of dollars on technically 
unnecessary facilities in order to secure their strategic position for the period 
of deregulation.  
 
The failure of network competition reflects the fact that most 
telecommunications networks, are natural monopolies. That is, the services 
concerned are most efficiently provided by a unified network with a single 
owner. It is very difficult to achieve competitive market outcomes in industries 
with a large component of natural monopoly. It is for this reason that 
telecommunications and similar services have historically been provided by 
government in most countries. Where, as in the United States, there are 
ideological objections to public provision, private monopoly providers have 
been tightly regulated. The advocates of competitive reform relied on 
arguments suggesting that, thanks to technological change, the concept of 
natural monopoly has become obsolete. Such arguments generally reflect 
wishful thinking rather than objective analysis. Some aspects of 
telecommunications, such as long-distance telephony, have indeed become 
more competitive as a result of technical change, but the convergence of pay-
TV, telephony and computing has the potential to create monopolies on an 
unprecedented scale. The expensive manoeuvring being undertaken by 
global players like Rupert Murdoch and Bill Gates as well as by 
telecommunications firms with dominant positions in national markets reflects 
the rich rewards that will be reaped by those who emerge with control over 
these monopolies. If technology is not simply to enrich a few monopolists, 
continued regulation will be necessary. 
 
The failure of competition undermines the central economic argument for 
privatisation; that it is inappropriate for government to own one firm in a 
competitive industry. Telstra will remain a dominant firm with its profits being 
determined primarily by government regulation rather than competitive forces. 
In this situation, control is better exercised directly through public ownership 
than indirectly through regulation. 
 
There remains the claim that privatisation yields a fiscal 'pot of gold' for 
governments. The metaphor is more appropriate than many of its users 
realise. The apparent financial benefits derived from privatisation are exactly 
like the 'fairy gold' that is said to crumble away overnight. Tricks of accounting 
can make it appear, in the short term, that governments benefit from 
privatisation. But the long-term effects have been unfavorable in almost every 
case. The first major privatisation undertaken in Australia, that of the 
Commonwealth Bank, illustrates this point. 
 
Between 1991 and 1996, the government sold its shares in the 
Commonwealth Bank prices between $5.40 and $10.00 per share, yielding 
sale proceeds of approximately $6.5 billion. Assuming all of this money had 
been used to reduce debt, the interest saved in 1997 would have been about 
$400 million, and some of that would have been recouped in income tax. In 
the same year, the shareholders of the Bank received fully franked dividends 
in excess of $800 million, without taking account of retained earnings of 
around $400 million. The loss to taxpayers associated with privatisation was 
well over $600 million in 1997 alone. There has been no year since 
privatisation commenced when interest savings exceeded the profits 
foregone, and the loss seems likely to grow even greater in the future. 
 
The situation of Telstra is, at least superficially, more complicated since a 
higher proportion of Telstra's profit is reinvested. This implies a smaller flow of 
dividends to government in the short run, but more rapid growth in the long 
run. In reality, the choice of whether to pay dividends or to reinvest earnings is 
largely a matter of accounting convenience. To assess whether the sale of 
Telstra is a good deal for the government, it is necessary to compare the 
savings in interest on public debt that can be realised through privatisation.  
 
Assuming a sale price of $45 billion, the government could reduce its interest 
payments by about $2.5 billion per year this year (and every year into the 
future) by selling Telstra and using the proceeds to repay debt. The 
government's would lose its claim to two-thirds of Telstra's earnings. This 
year, the value of this claim would be $2 billion and the government would be 
ahead by $500 million. But Telstra's profits have been growing rapidly and the 
market obviously expects that this growth will continue, whether or not Telstra 
is fully privatised. A conservative assumption is that Telstra's profits will grow 
in line with nominal GDP, that is by around 5 per cent per year. On this 
assumption, the short-term net benefit to the government would disappear 
within five years, to be replaced by a steadily increasing stream of losses. 
This would be consistent with past experience -- there has not been one 
major privatisation in Australia where the government has made a profit, 
relative to the alternative of retaining ownership.  
 
There remains the question of whether privatisation will increase Telstra's 
efficiency and profitability. In many respects, Telstra is already acting like a 
private corporation. For example, whereas public sector employees were 
formerly seen as being immune from dismissal, Telstra has shown itself to be 
willing to retrench staff whenever this would increase profit, or simply to match 
arbitrary 'benchmarks' applied by investors in telecommunications enterprises. 
In other areas such as, the abandonment of service to rural areas, Telstra will 
cut services unless it is prevented by regulation from do so. The main effect of 
privatisation would be to strengthen the forces pushing for more cuts in 
services. 
 
The vision of the future held out by the advocates of telecommunications 
reform has not materialised. A more realistic forecast is that users of 
telecommunications will be divided into three classes. Business users with the 
capacity to switch between telecommunications suppliers will receive services 
at their marginal cost of provision (almost nothing). Urban residential users 
will be a captive market, forced to pay all the fixed costs of the 
telecommunications network through higher connection fees. The poor and 
those in remote areas will be cut off. Meanwhile, profits that once flowed to 
the public as a whole will flow to those, predominantly in the top 20 per cent of 
the income distribution, who can afford to buy shares. 
